Download An Introduction to Philosophical Analysis (4th Edition) by John Hospers PDF

By John Hospers

This publication presents an in-depth, problem-oriented advent to philosophical research utilizing an exceptionally transparent, readable technique. The Fourth version doesn't purely replace insurance through the ebook, but additionally restores the introductory chapter—Words and the World—the such a lot wonderful, greatly acclaimed characteristic of the 1st variations.

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And if you put that together with the very widely held idea that personhood is itself a requirement of moral responsibility – only persons are capable of being morally responsible for their actions – you get the result that it’s appropriate to attribute moral responsibility to someone for their action just when the best explanation of that action is one that invokes the personal stance, as opposed to merely the intentional or design or physical stance. It looks as though this approach latches on fairly well to our ordinary attitudes to moral responsibility.

Regulative control is control of whether or not one performs the action in question, and thus requires that the agent could have done otherwise. Fischer (2006b, 8) thinks that the Consequence Argument shows regulative control to be incompatible with determinism (though see Chapter 3 for ways in which compatibilists have tried to get the ability to do otherwise to turn out to be compatible with determinism). On the other hand, he thinks that moral responsibility requires only a weaker kind of control, namely guidance control.

To give an explanation of behaviour from the personal stance is to give an explanation in terms of features that we take to be constitutive of personhood. These might include, for example, appealing to ‘reactive attitudes’ (for more on these, see the next section) – ‘She gave you the flowers because she was really grateful’, or ‘He did it out of spite’ – or rationality (‘She decided it was the best thing to do in the circumstances’). And if you put that together with the very widely held idea that personhood is itself a requirement of moral responsibility – only persons are capable of being morally responsible for their actions – you get the result that it’s appropriate to attribute moral responsibility to someone for their action just when the best explanation of that action is one that invokes the personal stance, as opposed to merely the intentional or design or physical stance.

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